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NOTES AND COMMENT
Editor-ROBERT D. FLEMING
]-VIDENCE-PRIVILEGE-APPLICATION TO WARRANTIES IN
LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES.
Privilege, the exception of a person from the common law rule,
has become an abuse. Useless suppression of truth can have but one
result in actions at law. Incomplete truths are more insidious than
falsity.
In the precedents of early English law, as soon as the secrecy of
confidential communication in general was settled, those between
physician and patient were seen to be on a par with all others.' That
no restraint existed as to the disclosure of information peculiar to a
physician, was recognized by the English courts.2 This doctrine
probably would have been adopted by the American courts,3 had it
not been for the statutory innovation of privilege, first enacted by
the New York Legislature, 4 to wit: "No person duly authorized to
practice physic or surgery, shall be allowed to disclose any informa-
tion which he may have acquired in attending any patient in a pro-
fessional character, and which information was necessary to enable
him to prescribe for such patient as a physician or to do any act for
him as a surgeon." This remained substantially as drafted through
its various re-enactments,5 until we now have it as set forth in the
present Civil Practice Act. 6 From the early cases,7 it has been the
tendency of the courts to construe this section strictly. Very little
has been said in support of such rule of privilege.8
'Duchess of Kingston's Trial, 20 How. St. Tr. 573 (1776).
'Wilson v. Rastall, 4 T. R. 753 (1792); Falmouth v. Mass., 11 Price 455
(Mass. 1822).
Sherman v. Sherman, 1 Root Conn. 486 (1793).
'NEw YORK REv. STAT. 1828, II, 406 (pt. III, c. VII, art. 9, §73).
'Laws of 1876, §834; CODE oF Civ. PRoc. §834.
N. Y. Crvm PRAcricE AcT §352.
Edington v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 564 (1871). "It is a just and
useful enactment introduced to give protection to those who were in charge of
physicians from the secrets disclosed to enable them properly to prescribe for
diseases of the patient. To open the door to the disclosure of secrets revealed
on the sick-bed, or when consulting a physician, would destroy confidence
between the physician and the patient, and, it is easy to see, might tend very
much to prevent the advantages and benefits which flow from this confidential
relationship." Gratton v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 564 (1879); see also
Hutchins, The Physician as an Expert (1904) 2 Micr. L. REv. 687.
8 Commission on Revision of the Statutes of New York, III, 737 (1836):
"The ground on which communications to counsel are privileged, is the stip-
posed necessity of a full knowledge of the facts, to advise correctly, and to
prepare for the proper defense or prosecution of a suit. But surely the neces-
sity of consulting a medical adviser, when life itself may be in jeopardy, is still
stronger. And unless such consultations are privileged, men will be incidentally
punished by being obliged to suffer the consequences of injuries without relief
from the medical art, * * *." Edington v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra note 7.
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In litigation such as the ordinary negligence action, the patient
does not seek to prevent his physician's testimony by claiming privi-
lege, but to the contrary. However, in an action such as one by the
beneficiary of a life insurance policy, we find the statute often in-
voked, once the relationship of physician and patient has been estab-
lished.9 And this because frequently the validity of the policy con-
tested depends, directly or indirectly, upon the health of the insured
at the time of the making of the application therefor.Y0
By legislative enactment an application for a life insurance pol-
icy becomes a part of the contract only when annexed thereto."
Also, in the absence of fraud all statements by the applicant, al-
though material, are deemed representations rather than warranties,
and do not necessarily defeat the policy. 12 So it appears that the
insurer, in order to successfully resist payment, must establish the
fact that the insured, at the inception of the contract, was guilty of
fraud.'3 This leads to the adducing of evidence showing that state-
ments made by the applicant as to his health were material and
untrue.14 It can readily be seen that in most cases this is impossible,
and consequently the advancement of fraudulent claims increases.
An insurance company is entitled to truthful answers to the
questions in the application, as to the insured's health-whether he
has or has had illnesses or injuries about which it deems important
to inquire, and whether he has undergone any operation, or has re-
ceived hospital treatment. These affect the risk which the company
is called upon to assume.' 5 To permit the beneficiary to hide behind
the privilege statute, preventing the insurer from learning the true
condition of the insured's health, is to encourage fraud and impose
upon the insurer conditions impossible to perform.
The courts, in their efforts to protect the insured or his repre-
sentatives, have been slow in realizing the growing abuse of the
privilege rule, and have repeatedly given judgment against the in-
'Cushman v. U. S. Life Ins. Co., 70 N. Y. 72 (1877).
10 Meyers v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 128 Misc. 703, 234 N. Y. Supp. 441 (1921);
Eastern Dist. Piece Dye Works v. Travelers Ins. Co., 234 N. Y. 441, 138
N. E. 401 (1921).
'Laws of 1909, c. 33, §58. "Every policy of insurance issued or delivered
within the state * * * shall contain the entire contract between the parties and
nothing shall be incorporated therein * * * unless * * * indorsed upon or
attached to the policy when issued."
' Supra note 11, " * * * and all statements purporting to be made by the
insured shall in the absence of fraud be deemed representations and not
warranties."
.Krauza v. Golden Seal Assurance Society, 247 N. Y. 536, 161 N. E.
172 (1928).
"Thomson v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 128 App. Div. 420, 113 N. Y. Supp. 225(4th Dept. 1908); Eastern Dist. Piece Dye Works v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
supra note 10.6 Saad v. New York Life Ins. Co., 201 App. Div. 544, 546, 194 N. Y.
Supp. 445, 447, affd, 235 N. Y. 550, 139 N. E. 730 (1923). "Whether or not
the consultation was in reference to a material matter was for the defendant tojudge, and not for the insured. * * *"
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surer when it failed to prove false and fraudulent representation.1"
Nor is there any indication that the Legislature, in whose province
the correction of this abuse rightly lies, has given the question any
consideration.
Our first departure from the established attitude of the courts
appears in the Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pomeranta.17 There the com-
pany sought to cancel a policy obtained by misrepresentation. Al-
though the insured had denied that he had received medical attention
within five years, it appeared that he had been treated by some five
different physicians on twelve different occasions. The defendant
hid behind the privilege rule, and the company was unable to prove
that these attendances had been for any serious ailment. Thus, while
it proved falsity, it could not prove that the false representation was
material. The court in its opinion by O'Brien, J., said, "He (the
insured) may insist upon this privilege but he cannot be heard to
say that no prima facie case has been made out. * * * He neither
denied nor explained the untrue statement in his application, and
gave no information concerning the state of his health at the time
of his medical attendance, or on the dates of his application or of his
payment of the first premium. To hold that the proof under such
circumstances is less than prima facie would be to condone and
encourage misrepresentations and to impose upon a litigant condi-
tions impossible of fulfillment. Plaintiff proceeded as far as the
law allows, and far enough, in the absence of denial, to require a
finding of material representation. All evidence is to be weighed
according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to have
produced and in the power of the other side to have contradicted." 17a
(Italics ours.) This was in direct contradiction to the opinion of
the Appellate Division,1 8 which held that not even unfavorable in-
ferences could be drawn from the insured's invoking of the privilege
rule.
In Minsker v. John Hancock 19 the court said that "The an-
swers * * * established as a matter of law that they were material
to the risk."
This rule was followed in Arnan'd v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co.,20 where although the facts were slightly different, the Court
quoted from the Pomerantz case, "* * * In the Pomerantz case, the
insured was squarely confronted with a question which he categori-
cally answered in the negative. In such a contingency the burden
" Kraus v. M. & G. W. Corp., 203 App. Div. 582, 196 N. Y. Supp. 845
(lst Dept. 1922) ; Rarogiewicz v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 242 N. Y.
590, 152 N. E. 440 (1926).
17246 N. Y. 63, 158 N. E. 21 (1927).
'-, Ibid. at 69, 158 N. E. at 23.
"218 App. Div. 431, 218 N. Y. Supp. 490 (1st Dept. 1926).
n254 N. Y. 333, 339, 173 N. E. 4, 5 (1930).
134 Misc. 357, 360, 235 N. Y. Supp. 726, 729, aff'd, 228 App. Div. 625
(1st Dept. 1929).
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would be upon 'the assured or his representatives to show that the
misrepresentation was not material."
By these decisions, it is obvious that the courts have seen the
injustice of imposing an impossible burden upon the insurance carrier.
The old rule enunciated in such cases as Cwhmain v. U. S. Life,21
wherein it was held that failure to disclose temporary disorders or
functional disturbances, as having no bearing on general health or
continuance of life, was not to be considered material misrepresenta-
tion, has finally been abrogated. The requirement of the insurance
company to sustain such burden has now been definitely changed.
22
It appears that this change is being consistently followed.
In the recent case of Jenkins v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Company,23 the beneficiary of a life insurance policy brought an
action to recover the proceeds thereof.. Payment was resisted on
the grounds that the insured had made false statements in her appli-
cation for the policy.24 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff. This the court set aside and dismissed the complaint.
Although the Appellate Division reversed the lower court and rein-
stated the verdict for the plaintiff distinguishing the facts in the
instant case from those in the Pomerantz and like cases, nevertheless
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court thereby
extending the rule to cases wherein the misrepresentations were made
not only to specific questions in an application but to general ques4
tions as well. It is indeed unfortunate that the correction of such
an evil, made possible by unfounded legislative enactment, 25 is left
to the courts. It is submitted that the attention of the legislature
be drawn to the situation and such harmful statute be modified, and
so deprive the unscrupulous practitioner of an unfair and dangerous
weapon.
ROBERT D. FLEMING.
CONSPIRACY, A MISDEMEANOR, IS NOT MERGED IN THE FELONIOUS
ACTS DONE IN FURTHERANCE THEREOF.
A recent decision 1 by the Court of Appeals has rendered obso-
lete another ancient common-law rule, which, until now, was deemed
' Supra note 9.
Supra notes 19, 17, 15; Schrader v. John Hancock, 251 N. Y. Supp. 169
(1st Dept. 1931).
=257 N. Y. 289, - N. E. - (1931).
'Ibid. at 291. Questions as to specifically enumerated diseases, etc., were
truthfully answered; the further question, "Have you within the past five years
had medical advice for any disease or disorder not included in the above?"
was not.
'5 WIGmORE, EVIDENcE (1923) §2380, p. 206.
' People v. Tavormina, 257 N. Y. 84, 177 N. E. 317 (1931).
